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We analyse the interaction between a seller and customers in a shop
on the fruits and vegetables wholesale market in Marseille using an
unique data set. We ﬁnd that customers’ bargaining activity is corre-
lated with the kind and location of the business. To determine how the
interactions between the seller and the customers inﬂuence prices, we
compare the price each customer pays for a given good with the daily
average price. We ﬁnd that a customer of the shop is more likely to
pay a price higher than other customers for the same good if—ceteris
paribus—the customer is unknown to the shop assistants, buys only a
small quantity, or buys goods sold on commission. If the customer is
known to the shop assistants, then loyalty and bargaining make it more
likely that the customer gets better than average price.










































The formation of prices in decentralized markets is an important issue in eco-
nomics (Muthoo, 1999). In decentralized markets—such as wholesale markets
for ﬁsh, meat, ﬂowers, or fruits and vegetables—prices and quantities are ne-
gotiated bilaterally between the buyer and the seller. There is a substantial
literature that studies the question of discrimination in markets; price discrim-
ination occurs when the prices of similar products sold by the same seller show
diﬀerence that cannot be attributed to diﬀerences in cost. While price dis-
crimination has been extensively studied in theoretical economics, empirical
studies are still rare, for an account see Verboven (2008).
In this paper, we study price discrimination using data from the wholesale fruit
and vegetables market in Marseille. Our data base allows to consider buyers’
behaviour and how it inﬂuences the likelihood of being discriminated against.
We begin by describing the two classical deﬁnitions of price discrimination
used in economics. We then describe our database and present the results of
our empirical analysis. Lastly, we conclude by proposing a new classiﬁcation
that could be used to classify the diﬀerent sorts of discrimination in repeated
matches.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the theory and pro-
vides empirical predictions, which are then tested at hand of the data. Section
3 presents the data and contains the empirical analysis. The last section con-
cludes.
2 Theory and empirical predictions
The perishable markets captivate the economists (Bestor, 1998; Graddy, 2006;
Kirman and Vignes, 1991; Kirman and Vriend, 2001; Rivaud-Danset and Vi-
gnes, 2004; Weisbuch et al., 2000) for two reasons: (1) they avoid all the
problems due to the inventories and (2) due to the problem of perishability









































8agents want to maximize their proﬁt and use the available information to learn
the limit prices of their opponents.
2.1 Deﬁnitions
Price discrimination occurs when the prices of similar products sold by the
same ﬁrm show variation that cannot be attributed to variation in marginal
costs.
Pigou’s Classiﬁcation Economists generally follow the taxonomy of Pigou,
who used the term price discrimination to describe what we have been referring
to as diﬀerential pricing. Pigou (1920) classiﬁes price discrimination into three
degrees:
First-degree price discrimination means that the producer sells diﬀer-
ent units of output for diﬀerent prices and these prices may diﬀer from
person to person. This is sometimes known as the case of perfect price
discrimination.
Second-degree price discrimination means that the producer sells diﬀer-
ent units of output for diﬀerent prices, but every individual who buys the
same amount of the good pays the same price. Thus prices depend on
the amount of the good purchased, but not on who does the purchasing.
A common example of this sort of pricing is volume discounts.
Third-degree price discrimination occurs when the producer sells output
to diﬀerent people for diﬀerent prices, but every unit of output sold to
a given person sells for the same price. This is the most common form
of price discrimination, and examples include senior citizens’ discounts,
student discounts, and so on.










































8Direct price discrimination is exercised on the basis of observable char-
acteristics of the buyers such as localization or job.
Indirect price discrimination sorts consumers by oﬀering menus of prod-
ucts that diﬀer in quality or quantity.
These deﬁnitions and classiﬁcations are very wide and can be made more
precise if we replace them in the context of interactions studied here. As
noted by Lucas (1988) “Applications of economic theory to market or group
behaviour require assumptions about the mode of interaction among agents as
well as individual behaviour”. The network of individuals which governs who
interacts with whom will have an important eﬀect on the nature and extent of
discrimination.
2.2 Price discrimination in an oligopoly
The literature on price discrimination covers a wide range of issues and in
particular concerns three diﬀerent cases depending on how much information
is available about the characteristics of buyers. This can be summed up as:
the homogeneous case, the observable heterogeneity case and the unobserv-
able heterogeneity case. In all cases, certain futures are necessary for price
discrimination to work. Essentially, there are two conditions required for dis-
criminatory pricing. First, the seller must have the ability to sort customers.
There must be a diﬀerent price elasticity of demand for each group of con-
sumers. Secondly, the seller must prevent resale. Buyers who have purchased
a good or services at a lower price must not be able to resell them to consumers
who would normally have paid the expensive price.
The eﬃciency of price discrimination (ﬁrst, second or third degree) and its con-
sequences have been extensively studied in theoretical economics. There have
been since Robinson (1933) a number of contributions examining the eﬃciency
consequences of imperfect price discrimination in the context of a monopoly.1









































8Theoretically, under conditions of perfect competition, price discrimination
could not exist even if the market could be easily divided into separate parts.
As Robinson (1933, p. 179) emphasizes, the demand would be perfectly elastic
in each section of the market and, every seller would prefer to sell his whole
output in the section of the market where he could obtain the highest price.
The attempt to do so would drive the price down to the competitive level
and there would be only one price across the whole market. As long as the
market is perfect, sellers can take advantage of the barrier between one part of
a market and another to charge diﬀerent prices for the same thing if and only
if all sellers are combined or are acting in agreement. If there is some degree of
market imperfection there can be some degree of discrimination. The market is
imperfect because customers will not move willingly from one seller to another,
and if it is possible for an individual seller to divide his market into separate
parts, price discrimination is practiced. Robinson (1933, p. 180) points out
that in a competitive market, sellers’ demand curves are likely to be very
elastic, and price discrimination will not usually lead to very great diﬀerences
in the prices charged to diﬀerent buyers by any seller. When a single seller
is not subject to direct competition, or when there is an agreement between
rival sellers, price discrimination is more likely to occur. Even when there is
no natural barrier between groups of customers there are various devices by
which the market may be divided so as to make price discrimination possible.
Various brands of a certain article which in fact are almost identical may
be sold as diﬀerent qualities under names or labels which induce subdivision
between buyers.
In a recent study about in competitive price discrimination, Borenstein (1985)
used simulations to analyze third-degree discrimination, Lederer and Hurter
(1986) examined on spatial pricing. Katz (1984) and Stole (1995) analyzed
second-degree price discrimination and Holmes (1989) extended the traditional
literature’s analytical approach to third- degree price discrimination in envi-
ronments of imperfect competition. Holmes (1989) demonstrates that in a
symmetric oligopoly model the eﬀects of price discrimination are quite similar









































8lies between the discriminatory prices, so that permitting price discrimina-
tion leads to higher prices for some consumers and lower prices for others.
Katz (1984) demonstrates a similar result in a model that, while developed in
terms of second-degree (quantity-dependent) price discrimination, amounts to
a model of third- degree discrimination because he assumes that there are two
types of consumers that are perfectly separated.
2.3 Price discrimination in a non-anonymous and re-
peated market
Sellers’ and buyers’ relationships are long-term relations embedded in a social
context. This context evokes such notions as contractual incompleteness, re-
peated interactions and social relationships. Those notions are potentially of
important economic signiﬁcance and play an important role in explaining the
existence of price discrimination.
Non-anonymous interactions and personal characteristics The rela-
tionships between sellers and buyers take place in a social context. Agents are
recognizable by their partners and we cannot consider that a representative
buyer exists (Kirman, 1992; Gallegati and Kirman, 1999). We must consider
each buyer as an agent characterized by a vector of intrinsic characteristics
having his personal story and knowledge about the market. The social part
of interactions have to be taken into account to understand how prices are
formed (Granovetter, 2001). Kuhn (2005) notices that “Markets are not self-
operating, objective mechanical objects. They are, rather, a complex set of
constraints, rules, rights, regulations, and laws, guiding human participants
in making their multiple, various trades, purchases, and exchanges. The mo-
tivating force that generates benign market outcomes is the willingness of all
to obey the guidelines and deal openly transparently with each other. Invisible
to the naked eye are the common social bonds of trust among all, strangers
and acquaintances alike. The bonds of trust are what create and sustain truly









































8markets, limit value), agents can have diﬀerent willingness to pay. Due to the
perishability of goods, sellers have to adapt their behaviour to the buyers to
minimize the quantity of unsold goods. As a very simple example, we can take
as an example the case in which buyers have either a given low or a high price
limit value. We can expect that buyers with a high limit value pay a higher
price than buyers with a low limit value.
Repeated interactions and strategic behavior In most decentralized
markets, there is no contract between the agents that guarantees the exact
term of trade. They are rather decided through daily matches. The fact that
their relationships are characterized by long term or repeated interactions can
involve strategic incentives beyond social norms. Agents use their experience
and act strategically in order to obtain better proﬁts with their counter-parts.
A basic lesson from game theory is that repeated interactions may create in-
centives that are absent in one-shot interactions (Rubinstein, 1998; Falk et al.,
1999). For example, buyers can try to develop a reciprocal reputation because
this may elicit lower prices from the seller. Kreps et al. (1982) shows that,
due to the existence of plausible reciprocal obligations, incomplete informa-
tion about one or both players’ options, motivation or behavior can explain
the observed cooperation in repeated games (for example in terms of loyalty).
Repeated interactions give information about agents’ strategies. For example,
a seller can adapt his negotiation strategy (for example by adjusting his oﬀers)
in order to insure the same price faced with a buyer used to bargain and a
buyer who is not used to. Seller can also adapt prices to the quantity that the
buyer is used to buy if he is faced with a buyer used to buy from him. We will
develop some of those intuitions later on.
2.4 Predictions
Correlation between loyalty, bargaining behaviour, and prices The
combination of repeated and non-anonymous interactions make agents behave









































8criminatory pricing. First, the seller has to have the ability to sort customers
and second, the seller must prevent resale. Buyers who have purchased a good
or services at a lower price must not be able to resell them to consumers who
would have normally paid the expensive price. In the environment previously
described, we are interested in the eﬀect of loyal and bargaining behaviour.
By choosing their loyalty and bargaining behaviour strategically, we show that
buyers will inﬂuence the level of the prices that they pay and we show three
relationships (1) walk-in customers will be more likely to be discriminated
against (pay a higher price on average), (2) the quantity bought plays a role,
i.e., customers who buy large quantities have more “market power” and can
bargain for a lower price than average. (3) Bargaining, perhaps with the threat
of never coming back, has a lowering eﬀect on the price. The ﬁrst and third
concepts are the most studied in the context of decentralized and repeated
negotiations. The points are frequently analysed in the management literature
but only few economic studies address this issue (see Verboven (2008) for an
exception). The next two subsections examine the evidence which helps to
explain the phenomena we document.
Bargaining and prices Generally, the bargaining process can be seen in 2
diﬀerent ways: (1) it is a way to exchange information about the global state of
the market and (2) it is a way to exchange quantitative information about the
prices that the parties are willing to pay. We adopt the second point of view
and we consider that bargaining is primarily driven by parties attempting to
learn about others’ limit values by analysing the sequence of oﬀers that they
observe.
Bargaining is an important part of the price formation process for perishable
goods. Markets for such goods are unstable (over time) and consequently there
is no equilibrium value of the good which can be readily estimated. Under these
conditions, the ﬁnal transaction price is correlated both with the characteristics
of the good and with the bargaining skills and power of the buyer and seller.
The impact of bargaining on prices is far from being completely determined.









































8and bargaining leads to low prices. When buyers choose the order in which
they bargain with suppliers of known characteristics, prices are determined
jointly by bargaining power and competitive intensity (the outside option to
bargain with rival suppliers). Bargaining power becomes less important to the
outcome as competition intensiﬁes and prices fall to marginal cost in the limit.
Davis and Holt (1994) show that bargaining does not involve necessarily lower
prices. By using laboratory experiments to compare posted price and bargain-
ing situations, they ﬁnd that, in the bargaining situations, sellers’ prices are
higher, and prices are stickier under haggle than under posted oﬀer. Sellers
anticipate that buyers bargain and hence increase their oﬀers during the bar-
gaining to conclude a transaction at the same price than when the prices are
posted.
Loyalty and prices An aspect of the market that is stressed in our research
is the fact that people tend to have regular relations with each other. Using
the same vocabulary as Hirschman (1970), “Exit” (leave a seller to another)
is a viable solution for the customers as long as there are some outside options
available to them. This is frequently observed in bilateral bargaining situations
and has led to the construction of many models. In a decentralized market,
the existence of loyalty is a direct consequence of repeated interactions and
the existence of switching cost. Considering that loyalty is endogenous, Stole
(2007) argues that sellers apply high reduction to insure the loyalty of their
customers. Buyers are faced with several sellers and can use the existence
of competition between sellers to obtain lower prices. Suppose a buyer has
to choose between two sellers a and b. In addition suppose that, due to the
purchase history, the buyer prefers the seller a to the seller b. Weisbuch et al.
(2000) show that seller b must make a large reduction to change the preferences
of the buyer and attract him away from seller a. On the same lines, Stole (2007)
argues that purchase history is useful because ex post heterogeneity between
goods can emerge. An otherwise homogeneous good becomes diﬀerentiated ex
post due to exogenous switching costs. It follows that the buyer who prefers









































8whom seller b would like to oﬀer a price reduction. In this case, purchase
history operates through a diﬀerent conduit of diﬀerentiation. Nevertheless,
the strategies of “paying customers to switch” (Chen, 1997) or “consumer
poaching” (Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000) can be proﬁtable and purchase history
provides a variable which can be used as the basis of dynamic third-degree price
discrimination. On the other hand, Weisbuch et al. (2000) study empirical data
from the Marseille Fish market and show that loyal buyers actually pay higher
prices than opportunistic ones. Several agent-based models try to reproduce
these stylized facts.
There are two types of models: (1) the ﬁrst type considers that being loyal
or not is an endogenous decision. Usually, the loyalty that emerges is due to
learning by agents, who discover which interaction gives them the highest proﬁt
and choose to interact with those agents that provide the highest gains. In this
case, the emergence of loyalty is shown to occur for certain values of learning
parameters (Weisbuch et al., 2000). If buyers can also learn which prices to
accept and sellers which prices to oﬀer, the emergence of loyalty also generates
price dispersion (Kirman and Vriend, 2001). In their process, buyers learn to
become loyal as sellers learn to oﬀer higher utility to loyal buyers, while these
sellers, in turn, learn to oﬀer higher utility to loyal buyers as they happen to
realize higher gross revenues from loyal buyers. In some cases loyalty is not
the main focus, but is the ﬁrst step for agents to stabilizing some negotiation
patterns, and these can be compared to recorded micro-behaviour on the real
market (Moulet and Rouchier, 2008). In these cases, the emergence of loyalty
is always due to the buyers’attraction to the highest proﬁt. (2) The second
type of study considers that loyalty is exogenous. As an example, Rouchier and
Mazaud (2004) consider it to be a sign of diﬀerent motivations: the pleasure
of interacting with well-known persons rather than strangers, moral norms,
or an anticipation of the risk that searching for low price leads to delays in
decision making and the danger that no goods are left when the decision is
ﬁnally taken. Lastly, in the case where several qualities exist, the seller can
secure the loyalty of his buyer by keeping the higher quality for loyal buyers.









































8eﬀect of quality on customer loyalty. He provides 3 arguments that consumers
use to choose a supplier based on quality. (1) There are increasing returns
in customer loyalty in exchange for a suppliers improvements in quality. (2)
The expected duration of a customers loyalty increases with the consumers
prior belief that a given supplier is good. Conversely, the probability that a
customer will defect to a competitor increases with the consumers prior belief
that the suppliers competition is better. (3) The optimal action for suppliers,
then, is to choose a quality level for which the marginal revenue from a quality
improvement equals the marginal cost of the change.
We now turn to the empirical evidence on which we base our conclusions.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data
The data comes from a single shop on the site of the fruit and vegetable
wholesale market MIN in Marseille (March´ e d’Int´ erˆ et National). The MIN
is jointly owned by the city of Marseille and private shareholders and leases
shops on its site to wholesalers. The MIN adminstration allows that only
eligible professional customers to enter the market site and purchase goods
there.2 Registered customers are often retailers, who sell fruits and vegetables
in their own shop or on farmers’ markets, but customers also include food
producers and restaurant owners. The MIN is open six days a week and is
closed on Sundays. In 2006, 50 shops were leased to wholesalers, 905 people
were working on the market, and 1733 customers were registered.
The data cover all the transactions that took place in the shop during the
eleven opening days between October 14 and October 26 in 2006. The in-
formation on individual transactions comes mainly from the electronic billing
and bookkeeping system of the shop. Further information was provided in
2Would-be customers have to apply to the MIN adminstration, providing evidence that









































8the form of copies of the checked daily print-outs of the system, often with
additional hand-written information. Information on customer characteristics
was obtained by interviewing the shop assistants and the owner of the shop.
A transaction is characterized by the type of good, its country of origin, the
price paid per unit of the good, the total quantity bought, and the day the
transaction took place.3 A good is deﬁned and classiﬁed according to the
oﬃcial Ctiﬂ classiﬁcation, which is very detailed, taking variety and quality
of the good into account.4 For example, diﬀerent varieties of apples such as
Golden Delicious or Granny Smith count as separate goods. The units of
quantity in which the goods are sold vary and can be the number of packs,
kilograms, or pieces.
Goods are sold either by the shop on its own account or on commission for
an external supplier. In more than half of the transactions, the goods are
sold by the shop on its own account. Because the goods are perishable, any
such good not sold at the end of the day may be worthless, incurring a loss
to the shop. In the remaining transactions, the goods are sold on commission
for an external supplier. For these transactions, the shop earns the diﬀerence
between the price agreed with the customer and the supply price arranged
with the external supplier. Because the shop does not own the goods, it is not
exposed to a loss if some of these goods are unsold at the end of the day.
The 2454 transactions can be classiﬁed into four diﬀerent types. Type 1 are
transactions where the customer buys the good in the shop, often after bargain-
ing over the price and quantity. Type 2 are transactions where the customer
pre-orders the good via phone on the previous day, but picks up the goods
himself in the shop. The customer might then bargain over the price of the
prepared order. Type 3 are transactions where the customer pre-orders the
3Transactions that took place on the two Saturdays during the sample period were
recorded jointly with transactions taking place on the respective following Monday. Sat-
urday and Monday transactions cannot be identiﬁed separately in the data set, leaving us
in eﬀect with nine trading days.
4The individual items of a good, such as individual Golden Delicious apples, are nearly









































8good via phone on the previous day and the shop delivers the goods to cus-
tomer’s address on the next day. The price is usually pre-arranged and billed
directly to the customer, so that no face-to-face bargaining takes place. Type
4 are transactions where the good was given to the customer for free as re-
placement for a poor quality good bought on the previous day. There is no
bargaining in this case. Our analysis focuses on the 2111 transactions of Type
1 and 2, for which face-to-face bargaining can take place.5
Shop’s customers are of two diﬀerent types. The ﬁrst type visits the shop
regularly and is known personally to the shop assistants. Regular customers
are often registered with the shop to allow them to purchase on account and
to facilitate the billing process. Some regular customers have more than one
buying agent visiting the shop on consecutive days or even the same day.
Visiting the shop on a regular basis does not necessarily mean, however, that
the customer is a loyal buyer. He may well buy elsewhere also. The second
type are walk-in customers, who visit the shop only occasionally. We know for
regular customers if they are loyal buyers, i.e., if they not only visit the shop
regularly but also buy their goods there; if they haggle over the unit price and
the quantity regularly, occasionally, or never; and if they are disciplined payers
if they do not pay cash. For walk-in customers, we only know that they pay
in cash and do not pre-order.
The interaction between shop assistant and customer is usually very short and
at any stage the customer may walk away. The bargaining process starts with
the shop assistant announcing an oﬀer price per unit. The customer can accept
or decline the oﬀer. The declining customer might then make a counteroﬀer,
often combined with mentioning the quantity she is prepared to buy at the
counteroﬀer price. The shop assistant will either accept directly or make a
ﬁnal oﬀer, which the customer then either accepts or declines.6 Regarding the
bargaining behavior of regular customers, we know for each customer if he
5Of all transactions, 9 are of Type 4 and 334 of Type 3.
6This is the standard professional interaction on the MIN, as we corroborated by inter-
viewing other shopkeepers. See also Kirman et al. (2005), who analyse detailed bargaining









































8bargains (i) never, (ii) occasionally, or (iii) regularly.
3.2 Buyer characteristics and bargaining strategy
We next analyse the correlation between buyers’ characteristics and their bar-
gaining strategies. To do so, we resort to Correspondance Analysis as devel-
oped by Benz´ ecri et al. (1973), see also Greenacre (1984) and Lebart et al.
(1984). Correspondence analysis is a descriptive/exploratory technique de-
signed to analyze simple two-way and multi-way tables containing some mea-
sure of correspondence between the rows and columns. The results provide
information which is similar in nature to those produced by Factor Analysis
techniques, and they allow one to explore the structure of categorical variables
included in the table.
Correspondence analysis is a multivariate method that applies for positive nu-
merical data tables and overall qualitative data. Rows of such tables are the
“observations” or “cases” and columns the “variables”. It allows the con-
struction of an orthogonal system of axes (called factors and denoted F1, F2,
etc...) where observations and variables can be jointly displayed. The factors
are constructed according to the information they represent and therefore are
presented in a decreasing order of importance. A maximum of n − 1 such
factors can be determined, where n is the lowest of the two numbers of obser-
vations and of variables. The information included in a subspace of dimension
p (p ≤ n − 1) equals the sum of information included in the p factors. In this
system proximity between observations or between variables are interpreted as
strong similarity. Proximity between observations and variables are interpreted
as strong relationship. The ability of displaying simultaneously observations
and variables on the same factorial space makes it easy to discover the salient
information included in a given data table.
To test if the personal and the behavioural characteristics are correlated, we










































8H0: The personal and the behavioural characteristics are indepen-
dent.
Ha: The personal and the behavioural characteristics are depen-
dent.
We have done the test for all the possible line-column combinations. The tests
shed light on only four relationships (see Table 1): the bargaining behaviour
is correlated to the location of buyer’s business, the business and the char-
acterization of buyer’s clientele. The payment behaviour is correlated to the
characterization of buyer’s clientele. The test does not show any correlation
between the other variables.
[Table 1 about here.]
To be more precise, we use Goodman and Kruskal’s τ.7 It indicates in which
proportion the behavioural factors are dependant on the personal factors. If
is interpreted as follows: Suppose that τ = x, this means that the personal
factors explain 100x% of the variations in the behavioural factors. We can also
say that the error ratio goes down to 100x% if the choice was done randomly.
The values of τ are presented in the Table 2.
[Table 2 about here.]
Buyer’s business and bargaining behaviour Figure 1 presents a sepa-
ration into clusters between three groups of buyers. The clusters appear in
three planes: The north east plane gathers buyers that transform the goods
(manufactures or caterers) and indicates that they do not bargain. The north
west plane gathers buyers with general food stand and wholesaler. For these
two categories the purchases on the whole market are a quite small part of
their activity and buyers bargain occasionally. The south west plane indicates
that buyers who sell the fruits and vegetables on a retail market (either on a
local market or a retail market) bargain more often.









































8An explanation of this division can be given by making a link between bar-
gaining and time. If we consider that bargaining is time consuming, then only
buyers that spend more time in the market can bargain, others do not have
any time. We can also justify this by saying that the higher is the importance
of those purchases (in term of time), the higher is the tendency to bargain.
Buyers bargain only if the proﬁt that can be generated is higher than the cost
to bargain.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Characterization of buyer’s clientele and bargaining behaviour Fig-
ure 2 presents a separation into clusters between three groups of buyers. The
clusters appear in the following planes: The north east plane indicates that
buyers that buy goods for themselves have a tendency to not bargain. The
north west plane indicates that buyers with customers from high quality price
segment have a tendency to bargain occasionally. The south west plane in-
dicates that buyers with customers from low quality price segment have a
tendency to bargain regularly. Lastly, we cannot infer from the graph con-
cerning the bargaining behaviour of the buyers with customers from medium
quality price segment. It seems that they either bargain regularly or not at
all. The ﬁrst intuition seems to be that all the professional buyers bargain.
If retail market customers are not willing to pay higher price to have access
to the quality, the buyer always tries to obtain low prices and hence regularly
bargains. If retail customers are willing to pay more for quality, buyers bargain
still occasionally. It is better for him to have low prices, but even if the prices
are not so low, he can sell the goods on the retail market.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Characterization of buyer’s clientele and payment behaviour Figure
3 presents a separation into clusters between 4 groups of buyers. The clusters









































8goods for themselves have a tendency to pay cash. The north west plane
indicates that buyers with customers from high quality price segment have a
tendency to have the variable payment equal to 1 and hence pay with short time
credit. The south west plane indicates that buyers with customers from low
quality price segment have a tendency to have the variable payment equal to 4
and hence pay with very long time credit. The south east plane indicates that
buyers with customers from medium quality price segment have a tendency to
have the variable payment equal to 2 and 3. Those clusters clearly indicate
that the payment behaviour of the buyers on the whole market depends on
the retail market8. The ﬁrst intuition seems to be that if retail prices are too
low, the buyer cannot cover all his fees and pays the wholesaler with delay.
If the characterization of buyer’s clientele is low, the stand owner applies low
prices. The proﬁt generated is hence low and the stand owner has hence more
diﬃculty to pay (in time) the wholesaler.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Buyer’s location and bargaining behaviour We ﬁrst test the link be-
tween the area and the bargaining behaviour. Nevertheless, the obtained graph
does not give rich information (Most of the points are close to the origin). We
cannot deduce anything for areas 13 and 84. This can be due to the division
of the area. Those two areas are quite large and there can be an important
heterogeneity between the buyers in the area. Areas 4 and 26 are separated
by the ﬁrst axis. This fact indicates that buyers from those two areas do not
have the same bargaining behaviour. To know more about the buyers from
areas 13 and 84, we could use the ZIP code. Nevertheless, the high number of
classes causes the frequencies to be too low.
3.3 Analysis of face-to-face bargaining
For the analysis of face-to-face bargaining between the seller and his customers,
we group the individual transactions on a same day and same good basis. This









































8grouping ensures that the goods are homogeneous between the transactions,
because they are taken from the same daily stock. Further, the daily group-
ing ensures that other circumstances on the market and day, which are not
observed by us, can be assumed to be constant between transactions.
Of the 815 day-good groups, 340 consist only of one transaction and are ex-
cluded from further analysis.9 The remaining 475 day-good groups have at
least two transactions and cover 161 diﬀerent goods. Table 3 provides infor-
mation on the transactions of the day-good groups.
[Table 3 about here.]
Two-thirds of the day-good groups show price variation between transactions
during the day, see Panel A. The average number of transactions per day-good
group is ﬁve, see Panel B. Groups with price variation during the day contain
slightly more transactions on average because more transactions give the shop
assistants more opportunities to adjust the price. Such price adjustments are
not inevitable, however, as the maximum of transactions for day-groups with-
out price variation shows. The quantity variable in Panel C is measured as the
turnover of the individual transaction relative to the turnover of all transac-
tions in the day-good group.10 There is no discernible diﬀerence between the
quantities bought by regular and walk-in customers. The median quantity is
0.2, which corresponds to the share one would expect if the quantity were the
same for each of the average ﬁve transactions per day. The deviations of the
quantities from the median is right skewed and positive deviations are larger
on average than (absolute) negative deviations. To measure negative price
discrimination, we compute the average price per unit of a good for each day-
good group and compare the average price with the price paid in the individual
transaction. Adverse price discrimination exists if the customer pays a price
above the average. This is the case for 34.5% of all transactions, see Panel
D. A test using the z-Statistic indicates that discrimination against walk-in
9For instance, only one customer bought red apples on the 26th.
10We measure ‘quantity’ as turnover share to allow comparison between goods sold in









































8customers is signiﬁcantly more likely than discrimination against regular cus-
tomers (using the usual signiﬁcance levels).
To examine if walk-in customers are more likely to be discriminated against
per se or because of their behaviour, we ﬁt binary probit regressions with
the discrimination indicator as the dependent variable.11 The explanatory
variables considered are the quantity bought in the transaction, the method of
payment, and if the good bought was on commission of the external supplier
or buyer (controlling for Type 2 transactions). Table 4 presents the regression
results.
[Table 4 about here.]
Panel A reports the result for the regression when only the quantity and the
customer type is considered; Panel B reports the results when the other vari-
ables are included. The cash payment and the buyer commission indicators are
excluded from the ﬁnal regressions because both had insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients
when included.12 The signiﬁcant coeﬃcients of the estimated probit models in
Table 4 show that customer behaviour plays a role in price discrimination.
Next to evaluate the eﬀect of the purchased quantity on the likelihood of
discrimination, we plot the predicted probability in Figure 4.13
[Figure 4 about here.]
As the Figure shows, quantity matters. The more the customer buys, the less
likely it is that will she be discriminated against and have to pay a higher
11Using a logit instead of a probit link function does not alter the qualitative results. This
also applies to the other regressions presented below.
12Further, because the supplier commission information is missing for one day, using this
variable leads to a loss of observations.
13The plots of the predicted probability as function of the quantity based on the other









































8than average unit price.14 The signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcients for regular cus-
tomers in both regressions in Table 4 show that walk-in customers have a
higher probability of being discriminated against. Whereas the probability of
being discriminated against for a regular customer buying the median quan-
tity is 31.6%, it is substantially higher for a walk-in customer buying the same
quantity and has a probability of 41.7%.
Panel B of Table 4 considers additionally if a good is sold on commission
for the supplier. As was discussed above, in this case, the risk of not selling
the perishable good is borne by the supplier, not the shop. Because we do
not observe information on commissioned goods for one day in our sample,
the number of observations in the second probit regression reported is smaller
than in the ﬁrst. The regression results show that the probability of a buyer
being discriminated against increases by about 13% if the good is sold on
commission. The economic argument is that the shop gains from high prices
from successful transactions, while the loss from keeping the goods and letting
them perish after an unsuccessful transaction is removed.
We now turn to the eﬀect of bargaining behaviour. Table 5 presents the
probit regressions for regular customers, taking their bargaining behaviour
into account.
[Table 5 about here.]
As expected, bargaining has a signiﬁcantly negative impact on the probability
of being discriminated against. The probability for being discriminated against
of a customer who bargains occasionally is about 13% lower than for a customer
who does not bargain. The probability is lower by 17% if the customer haggles
regularly. The coeﬃcient for the loyalty variable indicates that loyalty pays oﬀ.
Loyal customers have a 7% smaller likelihood of being discriminated against
than disloyal, but regular, customers.
14This assumes that the quantity is under the full control of the customer. The Appendix
presents results of an IV regression, where the actual quantity purchased is instrumented.
The hypothesis that the quantity is exogenously set by the customer cannot be rejected at









































8We further conducted some robustness checks of these results. The probit
regression results are qualitatively similar if only those cases are considered
where at least two diﬀerent customers purchased a good on a given day. If
transactions recorded on Mondays are excluded, because they consist in eﬀect
of Monday and Saturday transactions, then all but the loyalty coeﬃcient re-
main qualitatively the same. The loyalty coeﬃcient is still negative, but no
longer signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the usual signiﬁcance levels. This
stays unchanged if the Monday and Saturday and goods with only one cus-
tomer are excluded. The general results are thus fairly robust.15
3.4 Summary
We ﬁnd considerable second degree price discrimination in our data set because
diﬀerent customers pay diﬀerent prices for the same good on the same day. The
statistical analysis shows that customers’ behaviour impacts on the likelihood
of being discriminated. We ﬁnd that it pays oﬀ for customers to set up a
relationship with a given shop and to stay loyal to the shop. Further, the
larger the quantity the customer wants to buy, the more can improve the price
per unit. Bargaining tendencies also improve the price paid.
4 Conclusion
We have looked at the problem of price discrimination by analysing the data
from a single shop on the Marseille wholesale fruit and vegetable market. As
is usually the case in empirical work, the classiﬁcation of price discrimination
into diﬀerent types is far from clear-cut.
We ﬁrst show that buyers’ bargaining behaviour is correlated with their char-
acteristics. We use Correspondence Analysis to show that some buyers char-
acteristics have an impact on their behaviour. We hence show that (1) the
bargaining behaviour of buyers is determined by their business, the location









































8of the business and the characterization of their clientele and (2) the payment
reliability of the buyer depend on the characterization of the buyers’ clientele.
Regarding the interaction between buyers and the seller, we do ﬁnd a signif-
icant relation between three features and the probability of paying a higher
price. First, customers who are loyal tend to pay lower than average prices, in
contradiction to certain other studies such as that of Weisbuch et al. (2000).
There are subtle elements at work here. Charging a loyal customer more may
result in better service. The obvious candidate for this would be the quality
of the goods received or reserving goods for such customers. In our case the
quality element did not play a role, according to the evidence provided by the
shopkeeper, and no goods were reserved except for those explicitly ordered by
telephone. However, a loyal customer will implicitly receive better treatment
as the quantities provided by the seller are a function of his previous sales and
these are mainly determined by what the loyal customers buy. Whether or
not the loyal customer will get a higher price depends on the implicit cost of
selling to a walk-in customer. Selling to such a customer may reduce the goods
available for the loyal customers and if the latter do not ﬁnd what they want,
this may reduce their probability of remaining loyal. This eﬀect would tend to
drive the price charged to casual buyers up. Second, customers who bargain
obtain better prices. At ﬁrst sight this is obvious but if the seller knows that
he is faced with a bargainer he might propose a higher price initially as game
theory would suggest. However, the empirical evidence shows no such strategic
eﬀect. Third, goods sold on commission fetch higher prices as a result of the
lower risk involved for the seller.
This contribution of our paper could be thought of as providing an empir-
ical justiﬁcation for all the papers that simplify the agents’ representation
but model the markets as situations where agents co-evolve by adapting their
behaviour to the behaviours of their opponents and justify the attraction of
economists to the impact of bargaining and loyalty behaviour. We have shown
here that buyers are discriminated and that this discrimination is correlated










































8In this paper we simply take the fact that buyers face diﬀerent demands as
given but in future work we would like to explore the nature of the relationship











































The Appendix presents the results of a two-stage IV regression, which tests if
the quantity purchased is endogenous (Wooldridge, 2002, 15.7.2). The ﬁrst-
stage regression explains the actual quantity bought with the exogenous cus-
tomer characteristics loyalty and bargaining behaviour plus the quantity of the
same variety of good bought by the same customer on the most recent previous
day. We have only 666 observations available because not all customers bought
the same variety of good at least twice over the sample period. Panel A of
Table 6 presents the results of the ﬁrst stage regression. Although the overall
explanatory power is rather low with a coeﬃcient of determination of 4%, the
actual and the previous quantity have a signiﬁcant positive relationship.
[Table 6 about here.]
Panel B shows the results of a probit regression where the actual quantity is
replaced by the quantity predicted from the ﬁrst stage regression. All esti-
mated coeﬃcients have the same signs as before, but the coeﬃcient for the
(predicted) quantity is not signiﬁcant.16 Panel C shows, however, that the test
of exogeneity cannot be rejected at the usual levels of signiﬁcance. In that
case, the probit regressions given in the main text are more eﬃcient and the
interpretation should be based on these.
16Because the Newey coeﬃcient estimators are standardized, the magnitudes of the esti-
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8Figure 1: Symmetric graph of the correspondence analysis between the buyer’s









































8Figure 2: Symmetric graph of the correspondence analysis between the nature









































8Figure 3: Symmetric graph of the correspondence analysis between the nature
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Figure 4: Predicted probability Φ(xβ) of being price discriminated as a func-
tion of the quantity purchased. The probability is computed using the esti-
mated coeﬃcients given in Table 4 Panel A by varying the quantity variable.
The share of regular customers is ﬁxed at its sample mean. The 95% con-
ﬁdence interval for the predicted probabilities are based on 1000 bootstrap
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8Table 1: Risk to reject the assumption of independency between the variables.
Variables Risk
Location of buyer’s business and bargaining behaviour 3.38%
Business and bargaining behaviour 0.04%
Characterization of buyer’s clientele and bargaining behaviour 4.61%
Characterization of buyer’s clientele and payment behaviour 0.01%
Notes: Results of the independency test between the personal and behavioural
factors. The tests shed light on only four relationships: the bargaining be-
haviour is correlated to the location of buyer’s business, the business and the
characterization of buyer’s clientele. The payment behaviour is correlated to









































8Table 2: Test of Goodman and Kruskal
Test τ
Area explains bargaining behaviour 0.096
Business explains bargaining behaviour 0.183
Buyer’s customers explains bargaining behaviour 0.070
Buyer’s customers explains payment behaviour 0.151
Notes: Goodman and Kruskal’s τ to calculate in which pro-










































8Table 3: Summary statistics for day-good groups and price discrimination.
Panel A: Day-good groups
With Without All
Daily price variation 296 179 475
Panel B: Transactions per day-good group
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Total
With price variation 5.1 5 2.5 2 12 1188
Without price variation 4.3 3 2.6 2 14 583
All 4.8 4 2.5 2 14 1771
Panel C: Quantity per transaction
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Total
Regular customer 27.2% 20.2% 21.4% 0.6% 93.9% 1641
Walk-in customer 22.4% 16.7% 19.8% 1.8% 85.7% 130
All 26.8% 20.0% 21.3% 0.6% 93.9% 1771
Panel D: Transactions with price discrimination
Transactions Proportion z-Statistic
Regular customer 1641 33.5% 3.05∗∗∗
Walk-in customer 130 46.9%
Notes: Price variation in Panels A and B indicates if the sales price per unit varies
between transactions on a day. Quantity in Panel C is transaction’s share relative to the
turnover of a transactions in the same day-good group. Proportion in Panel D indicates
the share of transactions in which a customer paid more than the daily average price.
The z-Statistic is the square root of a Wald-Statistic based on a bootstrapped covariance
matrix estimator using 500 replications. The one-sided hypothesis ‘Proportion for walk-
in customers is at most as large as the proportion for regular customers’ can be rejected
at the 1% signiﬁcance level (∗∗∗). The z-Statistic is asymptotically standard normal









































8Table 4: Probit models for price discrimination of regular and walk-in cus-
tomers.
Panel A
Variable Coeﬃcient z-Statistic P-Value
Quantity -6.671 -5.04 0.000
Quantity squared 13.247 3.24 0.001
Quantity cubed -9.220 -2.67 0.008
Regular customer -0.270 -2.36 0.018
Constant 0.668 4.60 0.000
Observations 1771 Wald-Statistic 129.88
Pseudo R2 0.063 P-Value(Wald-Stat.) 0.000
Panel B
Variable Coeﬃcient z-Statistic P-Value
Quantity -6.576 -5.10 0.000
Quantity squared 12.861 3.32 0.001
Quantity cubed -9.121 -2.81 0.005
Regular customer -0.276 -2.32 0.021
Commissioned good 0.282 4.02 0.000
Constant 0.522 3.35 0.001
Observations 1674 Wald-Statistic 148.05
Pseudo R2 0.076 P-Value(Wald-Stat.) 0.000
Notes: Dependent variable is the price discrimination indicator. The in-
dicator is 1 if the customer pays a price above the daily average in the
same day-good group; the indicator is 0 otherwise. The probability of the
indicator is modeled as Φ(xβ). Φ is the distribution function of a standard
normal variable, x contains the explanatory variables, and the coeﬃcients
are estimates for β. z-Statistics are computed using bootstrapped stan-
dard errors with 500 replications. Panel B includes additionally a dummy
that is 1 if the good bought in the transaction was sold on commission for










































8Table 5: Probit models for price discrimination of regular customers taking
their behaviour into account.
Panel A
Variable Coeﬃcient z-Statistic P-Value
Quantity -5.751 -4.18 0.000
Quantity squared 10.927 2.69 0.007
Quantity cubed -7.505 -2.24 0.025
Occasional bargaining -0.336 -2.28 0.023
Regular bargaining -0.498 -2.58 0.010
Loyal buyer -0.183 -1.77 0.076
Constant 0.736 3.14 0.002
Observations 1641 Wald-Statistic 86.17
Pseudo R2 0.067 P-Value(Wald-Stat.) 0.000
Panel B
Variable Coeﬃcient z-Statistic P-Value
Quantity -5.433 -3.63 0.000
Quantity squared 9.720 2.22 0.027
Quantity cubed -6.661 -1.86 0.063
Occasional bargaining -0.354 -2.23 0.026
Regular bargaining -0.535 -2.62 0.009
Loyal buyer -0.193 -1.73 0.084
Commissioned good 0.332 4.57 0.000
Constant 0.567 2.39 0.017
Observations 1548 Wald-Statistic 124.72
Pseudo R2 0.081 P-Value(Wald-Stat.) 0.000
Notes: Dependent variable is the price discrimination indicator. The in-
dicator is 1 if the customer pays a price above the daily average in the
same day-good group; the indicator is 0 otherwise. The probability of the
indicator is modeled as Φ(xβ). Φ is the distribution function of a standard
normal variable, x contains the explanatory variables, and the coeﬃcients
are estimates for β. z-Statistics are computed with bootstrapped stan-
dard errors with 500 replications and clustered with respect to the buyers.
Panel B includes additionally a dummy that is 1 if the good bought in the
transaction was sold on commission for an external supplier. This variable









































8Table 6: IV Probit regression where the actual quantity is instrumented using
Newey’s eﬃcient two-step estimator.
Panel A: First Stage Regression
Variable Coeﬃcient z-Statistic P-Value
Previous quantity 0.272 4.11 0.000
Occasional bargaining 0.058 2.97 0.003
Regular bargaining 0.048 1.64 0.101
Loyal buyer 0.030 1.34 0.182
Constant 0.172 6.25 0.000
Observations 666 R2 0.040
Panel B: Second Stage Probit Regression
Variable Coeﬃcient z-Statistic P-Value
Quantity -0.056 -0.03 0.974
Occasional bargaining -0.668 -4.07 0.000
Regular bargaining -1.118 -4.82 0.000
Loyal buyer -0.284 -1.76 0.079
Constant 0.336 0.91 0.363
Observations 666 Wald-Statistic 38.08
P-Value(Wald-Stat.) 0.000
Panel C: Wald Test of Exogeneity
Test Statistic 1.30 P-Value(Wald-Stat.) 0.254
Notes: Dependent variable in the ﬁrst stage regression is the quantity
bought. Previous quantity is the amount of good of the same variety
bought by the same customer in the most recent transaction. Second stage
probit regression has the discrimination indicator as dependent variable.
Quantity in the second stage regression is the predicted quantity of the
ﬁrst stage regression.
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